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In a historic landslide election victory on January 16, 2016,
Dr. Tsai Ing-wen of theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP)was
voted into office as Taiwan's first woman President.1 Following
on the heels of the inauguration of Park Geun-hye in 2013 as
South Korea's first female president, Tsai's election further
expanded the success of “ruling women” throughout Asia,
where a striking number of women have been elected head of
state (Hoogensen and Solheim, 2006). Park Geun-hye was the
first woman democratically elected president in East Asia,
breaking a long-standing gender barrier in the so-called
Confucian cultural area. Yet, as the daughter of former
President Park Chung-hee, Park can also be regarded as simply
the latest example of a pattern that is well known to observers
of Asian politics: the female politician who derives legitimacy
through her familial ties from a male leader, whether as wife,
widow, daughter, or sister. This “dynastic descent” model has
brought Asia's most famous female leaders. However, it has
also raised serious questions about whether these women can
truly be considered pioneers, “agents of refreshing change,” or. This is an open access article unmere representatives of dynastic authority and “business as
usual” for the region (Iwanaga, 2008; Hoogensen and Solheim,
2006; Fleschenberg, 2008; Crossette, 1996). Journalist Barbara
Crossette once urged readers enthralled by “Asia's Ruling
Women” to “look again”: “anyone who would write feminist
history needs to look hard at how these powerful women have
ruled, and what their exercise of authority has meant to the
people they governed” (Crossette, 1996).
Expressing similar skepticism, Andrea Fleschenberg has
argued that “Asia's women politicians at the top are roaring
tigresses in termsof electoral and governmental record, but tame
kittens in terms of pro-women agenda-setting” (Fleschenberg,
2008, 50). Fleschenberg's study of Asian women politicians
focused on eight countries in South and Southeast Asia. Notably
missing from her discussion are East Asian countries like
Taiwan, where women have enjoyed electoral successes at
various levels (Sun, 2005). The number of female legislators in
Taiwan is currently 33.6% (Central Election Commission, 2015),
impressively high compared to Japan, where women's parlia-
mentary representation stands at 8.1%, South Korea (15.7%),
and even theworld average (22.2% in 2015) (Huang, 2015, 207,der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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important, we contend, as an exception to the “dynastic
descent” model of female leadership in Asia, and provides an
opportunity to examine the potential for Asian women leaders
as agents of social change and pioneers in social justice.
Ifmany of Asia'smost famous female leaders—Indira Gandhi,
Corazon Aquino, and Aung San Suu Kyi, for example—rose to
political leadership following the imprisonment or assassination
ofmale familymembers, in the early years of Taiwan's transition
to democracy (1980–1990), many female candidates were
similarly the wives or widows of famous political prisoners or
martyrs. By the 2000 presidential election, however, it was clear
that Taiwanese women's political participation had moved
beyond this phase. In 2000, Taiwan elected its first female vice
president, Annette Hsiu-lien Lü (hereafter Lü Hsiu-lien呂秀蓮):
a woman who has forged her own political path, and is famous
as a pioneer of Taiwan's autonomous feminist movement. Long
before Tsai's historic victory, then, Taiwan joined the select
group of nations with a woman elected to the vice presidency,
and an even smaller cohort of countries with an avowed
feminist in the top circle of power.
The unique position of Lü Hsiu-lien as both a pioneering
feminist and a female vice president prompts us to askwhether
she was able to promote a pro-woman agenda during her
two-term tenure in the vice presidential office (2000–2008). In
short, will she go down in history as a female vice president or a
feminist vice president? The distinction between descriptive
representation, which serves the symbolic purpose of gender
equality, and substantive representation, which assumes that
women politicians act on behalf of women, is central to the
analysis of gender and political representation (Celis et al.,
2014; Iwanaga, 2008, 4). Most of the literature on this question
has concentrated on female legislators and on European or
North American case studies. Studies of Taiwan have similarly
focused on women in the legislature, aiming to explain the
relatively high level of female representation, and to examine
whether this “critical mass” has improved the substantive
representation of women (Gelb, 2010; Clark and Clark, 2000;
Huang, 2015; Sun, 2005). In contrast, we approach the issue of
descriptive versus substantive representation from a different
angle, examining an individual female elite as a top leader in
the executive branch in order to contribute to the writing of
feminist history on Asia's “ruling women” as called for by
Crossette. Lü is an interesting comparative example since she is
roughly the same age as Sonia Gandhi, Khaleda Zia, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, Aung San Suu Kyi, Chandrika Kumaratunga,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Hasina Wajed, and moreover
similarly rose to prominence under circumstances of “political
turmoil and/or transition” (Fleschenberg, 2008, 33). We
furthermore focus on Lü because her role as a feminist pioneer
andTaiwan's first high-level female political leader is an essential
part of the story of women's “impressive rise” (Ramzy, 2015) in
Taiwan's politics, and hence of Taiwan's overall democratization.
By examining Lü's feminist ideology as expressed in her seminal
work New Feminism (Xin nüxing zhuyi 新女性主義, 1974) and
her track record as Taiwan's vice president, we contend that
it is unfair to characterize Lü as a “tame kitten,” for her pursuit
of an overt feminist agenda was impeded by constraints
she faced from both Taiwan's constitutional structure and
her party's patriarchal culture, as well as a gap between Lü
and Taiwan's contemporary women's movement. Wefurthermore contend that the label “tame kitten” is itself
laden with gendered assumptions about female leadership,
which should be reevaluated with reference to Lü's own
articulation of an indigenous Taiwanese feminist theory.
Indeed, Karen Celis et al. (Celis et al., 2014, 151) have theorized
that “the simple presence of female elected representatives
pursuing feminist goals within political institutions can no
longer be taken as a standard test of women's substantive
representation.”We follow their approach in asserting that the
very definition of “women's issues” cannot be assumed a priori,
but should be identified through open-ended investigation and
understood as produced through “active, multifaceted, and
contingent process” (Celis et al., 2014, 152).
Materials and methods
Our research draws on interviews conducted with Lü
and other feminist activists, analysis of published texts and
speeches by Lü, a survey of the major Taiwanese newspaper
coverage of Lü between 2000 and 2008, and participant
observation in the Taiwanese feminist and pro-democracy
movements in addition to a review of secondary literature. In
order to identify the factors that both enabled and constrained
Lü's political career, the following sections will briefly trace her
personal political biography and the evolution of her feminist
philosophy. We then assess her record in the vice presidential
office with regard to substantive representation. Finally, we
consider Lü's legacy for women's participation in Taiwan's
electoral politics, and her case as a counter-example to
stereotypes about Asian women as political leaders. We
conclude that despite constraints on Lü's pursuit of an overt
feminist agenda in elected office, she has great significance as a
female political leaderwho transcends both the dynasticmodel
of women's leadership common in Asia and the tokenistic
model of women as decorative “flower vases” (huaping 花瓶),
promoted by male patrons on the basis of their feminine
charisma rather than political abilities.
Discussion
The long road to high ofﬁce
As noted by Kazuki Iwanaga, that women in Asia,more than
any other region, have been able to attain the highest political
positions in their countries, although “the lack of a political
culture supportive of women's political involvement is strongly
manifested in many societies in Asia,” has long been a puzzle
(Iwanaga, 2008, 6). In explaining this puzzle, the Western
media has typically centered on women as dynastic represen-
tatives, for example: “Political dynasties are seen in other parts
of the world but Asia is striking for the lack of female leaders
who have come to power in any other way” (Macnamara,
2011). This dominant narrative may be intertwined with the
stereotype that “women in East Asia are often portrayed as
passive, easily manipulated and thus political followers”
(Chang and Welsh, 2013, 1). In this section, we trace Lü
Hsiu-lien's path to political office as a counter-example to the
dominant popular narrative regarding Asian women's route to
power.
Lü Hsiu-lien was born in Taoyuan, Taiwan in 1944, just
before the end of Japanese colonial rule (1895–1945), into a
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several major events: the return of Taiwan to Chinese control
following World War II; the infamous February 28 Incident of
1947 and the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT)
government's brutal suppression of a local Taiwanese protest
movement; and the retreat of KMT forces and “Mainlander”
(waishengren 外省人) refugees to Taiwan after the Communist
Revolution of 1949. Lü came of age during an era ofmartial law,
one-party rule, strident anti-communist ideology, and the
ethnic dominance of Chinese Mainlanders in the political
arena (Lü and Esarey, 2015).
Lü also came of age in a time when traditional Confucian
gender ideology, which subordinated women to men and
relegated them to the domestic sphere, held sway. While this
ideology profoundly shaped Lü's early childhood experiences,
she also benefited from her family's idiosyncratic decision to
raise her like a boy, and their emphasis on her education
(Rubinstein, 2004, 249). Lü excelled in school, and in 1963 she
won first place in the highly competitive entrance exam to the
National TaiwanUniversity School of Law. After earning her BA,
she again took first place in the exam for the National Taiwan
Universitymaster's program in law. In 1969, shewas awarded a
scholarship to study at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, earning an LLM in Comparative Law in 1971.
Pioneering feminist
While studying in the US, Lü experienced life in a liberal
democracy and witnessed the emergence of a vibrant feminist
movement. In 1971, she returned to Taiwan to work as
Section Chief with the Commission of Laws and Regulations in
the Executive Yuan (1971–1974). She also sought to reform
Taiwanese society by promoting liberal democratic ideals.
Spurred on by several highly publicized cases of gender
discrimination, Lü launched a series of newspaper editorials
protesting inequality of the sexes. Gaining recognition thus,
Lü began promoting an autonomous women's movement,
founding a feminist publishing house and a hotline for battered
women and rape victims, and eventually quit her job to become
a full-time activist (Teng, 1989; Lü and Esarey, 2015).
Combining Western feminist theory with her personal
analysis of Taiwanese society, Lü formulated her own feminist
ideology, first published in 1974 as the New Feminism, a text
that became the bible of the women's movement in 1970s
Taiwan. In this book (reprinted numerous times between 1974
and 2008), Lü laid out an eclectic mix of liberal feminism and
difference feminism,whichDoris Changdescribes as a uniquely
Taiwanese strand of “relational feminism” (Chang, 2009, 9;
Offen, 1988). Lü emphasized the fundamental notion of equal
treatment for men and women, protesting gender discrimina-
tion in education, employment, and law. While attacking
elements of traditional Confucian gender ideology, Lü also took
pains to emphasize that her “new feminist” ideology differed
fromWestern feminism. She argued, for example, that itwas not
a demand for women's rights, but for human rights. “Women's
rights as human rights” became her trademark slogan. In
addition, with a nod to Confucianism, Lü foregrounded not
women's “rights,” but rather their potential contributions to
society were they allowed to fully exercise their “abilities.”
Lü's emphasis on “fairness” for both sexes over “women's
interests” narrowly defined was evident in her criticism ofTaiwan's reserved seats system, which guaranteed women a
minimumnumber of seats at all levels of elected office. An early
adopter of this institutional measure to promote gender parity,
Taiwan had ensured a basic level of women's political represen-
tation (around 10%) as early as the 1950s (Huang, 2015, 208;
Chou et al., 1990, 90–92). However, by the 1960s, the system
was already becoming outdated, with the quotas set too low
(Chou and Clark, 1994, 164). Lü and others protested that the
reserved seats effectively served as a ceiling suppressing greater
levels of female participation and stigmatized those elected
to office. While acknowledging that such affirmative action
had been “kind” and “encouraging” to women, Lü called for the
abolition of the reserved seats system on the grounds that it was
“unfair” and hindered women from using their “genuine talent”
to shine in the political arena (Lü, 1977a, 67–72).
Although the substitution of “human rights” for “women's
rights” and contributions over entitlements might be regarded
as a rhetorical strategy tomakeher “new feminism” compatible
with the conservatism of Taiwan in the 1970s, Lü in fact had
strong points of disagreement with American feminism as she
had encountered it. First, Lü rejected the “sameness feminist”
position that equality meant elimination of gender differences.
Supporting instead “difference feminism,” Lü argued that
women should not strive to be like men, but should be “who
they are.” In effect, she endorsed women's pursuit of higher
education and professional careers while maintaining tradi-
tional gender roleswithin the family. Lü championed the image
of the newwomanwho “holds a spatulawith her left hand, and
a pen with her right hand” (zuoshou na guochan, youshou wo
bigan左手拿鍋鏟,右手握筆桿) (Lü, 1977b, 32; Lee, 2014, 35). She
furthermore advocated that talentedwomen should show their
femininity by using dress and makeup to cultivate a “soft” and
“beautiful” appearance. Finally, understanding that sexual
liberation would be a flashpoint for resistance in Taiwan's
highly conservative society of the 1970s, Lü proclaimed that
“new feminism” endorsed “love beforemarriage,marriage then
sex” (Lü, 1977a, 152–154). Hence, Lü fought against institu-
tional gender discrimination, while simultaneously upholding
certain traditional standards of femininity, domesticity, female
beauty, and chastity. Lü's relational feminism, as Chang
writes, “suggested that one's individual freedom should be
counterbalanced by fulfillment of specific obligations in family
and in society” (Chang, 2009, 92).
Despite Lü's concerted efforts to make feminism compat-
ible with aspects of Confucianism, and to avoid challenging
Taiwan's capitalist socio-political order, she drew fire from
conservatives, and was soon subjected to political pressure
and government surveillance. The martial law regime feared
any political radicalism, and treated Lü's women's movement
as a potential anti-government activity. Their harassment only
pushed Lü (once a KMT member) to perceive the government
as corrupt and oppressive. Traveling abroad, she interacted
with advocates of Taiwanese independence, and “began to see
the establishment of a democratic and independent Taiwan
with newenthusiasmwhen [she] realized that democratization
and feminist activism are two sides of the same coin” (Lü and
Esarey, 2015, 64).
Discouraged by setbacks to hermovement, Lü left to pursue
a second LLM at Harvard Law School in 1977. She returned to
Taiwan in 1978, and ran for a seat in the National Assembly (Lü
and Esarey, 2015, 78–91). Unfortunately, this runwas cut short
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suspended the elections. This crisis propelled Lü's entry into
the Dangwai (黨外, “outside the party”) opposition movement,
which advocated Taiwanese self-determination. In sharp
contrast to many American feminists of the 1970s, who began
their political engagement in the civil rights or anti-war
movements and then turned to feminism, Lü began her
political engagement on the issue of women's rights, and then
turned to the broader issues of democratization because of
her experiences advocating feminism under the strictures of
martial law.Lü and the Dangwai
Whereas Lü had remained politically neutral while
pioneering the women's movement, the canceled election
served as a tipping point in her radicalization (Chang, 2009,
104). Lü became deputy publisher of the Dangwai's Formosa
magazine, once again putting the power of her pen to work. In
1979, Lü delivered a speech criticizing the KMT regime at a
human rights rally that was violently suppressed in a crack-
down that became famous as the Kaohsiung Incident. Following
a trial by military court, Lü and other Formosa leaders were
found guilty of sedition and imprisoned. Lü was sentenced to
twelve years, and served nearly 2000 days in jail before being
released on medical parole.
Following parole in 1985, Lü spent three years (1986–1989)
as a Visiting Fellow in the Harvard Law School's Human Rights
Program. She then returned to Taiwan, running for a seat in the
Legislative Yuan in the 1992 elections, the first major election
after the lifting ofmartial law in 1987.Women politicians of the
1970s had already achieved an importantmilestone, exceeding
the quota of reserved seats in Taiwan's National Assembly and
Legislative Yuan (Farris, 2004; Chou et al., 1990; Lee, 1997;
Huang, 2005; Chiang, 2008). Now, Lü firmly believed it was
time for women's political participation to move beyond the
“victimization sentiment” (Hoogensen and Solheim, 2006)
stage of the 1980s, during which numerous wives/widows
of jailed or martyred opposition leaders had been elected to
office as political proxies. Lü fervently hoped to prove that
women could be elected to office based on their own merits
and without reliance on either affirmative action or ties to a
prominent male political figure (Interview with Lü Hsiu-lien,
12 February, 1989).
Lü furthermore asserted that the time was ripe for self-
declared feminists to enter the political arena. At an event for
Lü hosted by Awakening, a feminist group founded in 1988, she
raised the issue that women leaders such as Indira Gandhi and
Margaret Thatcher had done very little to improve the status of
women, and urged feminist groups to put forward candidates
for the next election (Lee, 2014, 142). However, as Awakening
leader Lee Yuan-chen recalled, many that evening voiced a
desire for feminists to stay out of electoral politics, maintaining
their non-partisan neutrality in order to best promote their
feminist goals. Lü opposed this separation of “women's
movement” and “politics.” While Lee promised Awakening's
support for Lü's campaign, this disagreement made evident
Lü's growing divergence from the autonomous women's
movement. Looking back on this turning point, Lee reflected:
“From this, it was apparent that Hsiu-lien had a much morecourageous personality than I, andwaswilling to risk thewinds
of politics” (Lee, 2014, 145).
Like many of Asia's top female political leaders, Lü
campaigned as a “transitional [agent] with a political agenda
for remodeling” the political regime (Fleschenberg, 2008, 33).
She furthermore used her status as a former political prisoner
to mobilize followers, although this was not her sole source of
political capital. Running as a candidate from the DPP (founded
in 1986), Lü won a seat in the Legislative Yuan (1993–1996),
serving as the Convener of the Foreign Affairs Committee in
1994. Lü was then elected Mayor of Taoyuan County (1997–
2000) before presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian invited Lü
to be his running mate in the 2000 election (Lü, 2006, 3). The
Chen–Lü ticket won the 2000 election, and was reelected in
2004.
Although Lü did not come into power through dynastic
descent, her political biography shares key elements common
to Asia's top women leaders (Fleschenberg, 2008, 31;
Hoogensen and Solheim, 2006). First, she has an outstanding
educational career, including attendance at an international
elite university. Second, rising to prominence within an
environment of political turmoil and transition, Lü was able to
mobilize victimization sentiment and campaigned as a “trans-
formational leader.”However, in sharp contrast to themajority
of Asia's “ruling women,” Lü was not raised in a prominent
political family, nor was she amember of an entrenched social-
political elite. Rather, as a native Taiwanese from a lower
middle-class background, shewas an outsider in aMainlander-
dominated era of KMT rule. Lü further differs in that she had a
track record of political experience before running for high
office.We also note that Lü diverges from the general pattern of
Asia's “ruling women” in that she has never been married and
remains childless. Whereas many Asian women leaders have
leveraged their “housewife image” to put a positive spin on
their political inexperience by invoking stereotypical notions of
feminine moral purity and caring, Lü's image was that of a
single career woman and feminist (Fleschenberg, 2008, 32–33;
Hoogensen and Solheim, 2006).
Gender in the campaign
If Lü is distinct from Asia's other top female leaders in her
departure from the dynasticmodel and her long track record as
a feminist, her case nonetheless begs the question—was Lü
elected because of her feminist profile, or in spite of it? Gender
certainly played a role in the campaign. Chen Shui-bian's
decision to invite Lü to be his running mate was made
according to careful political calculations, which included
gender among other factors. As the former defense attorney
for the “Kaohsiung Eight,” Chen sought a running mate from
this older generation ofDangwai leaders, singling out “Taiwan's
number one woman of talent” (Taiwan diyi cainü台灣第一才女)
(Chinareviewnews. com, June 14, 2011). As Chen told Lü: “You
are female, I am male. You are from the North, I am from the
South. Your legislative background is in foreign affairs andmine
is in national defense. You studied abroad, and I did not.We are
complementary” (Interview with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010).
In this calculation, descriptive representation trumped sub-
stantive representation: that is, nominating Lü served the
“symbolic purpose of gender equality,” rendering “a greater
legitimacy… to the political system,”without the promise that
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expected to specialize in foreign affairs (Iwanaga, 2008, 3–4).
Asserting that he had selected Lü based on her qualifications
and not gender, when Chen publicly announced Lü as his
running mate he declared: “she will not be a ‘flower vase,’ but
shewill really governwithmewhenwe get elected” (Interview
with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010). It appears that the party was
attempting to have its cake and eat it too: floating a female
running-mate in order to attract women voters, while also
downplaying Lü's sex by emphasizing her gender-neutral
qualifications.
Lü herself viewed the mobilization of women voters as key
to the campaign strategy, and touted the election as a historic
opportunity to “put an end to government solely bymen; [and]
to usher in an era of gender equality in whichwomen andmen
administer national affairs together” (Lü and Esarey, 2015).
On International Women's Day, she chartered a train to bring
2000 prominent women across Taiwan, with each car of the
train featuring a workshop on women's issues (Interview with
Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010; Lü and Esarey, 2015, 270). Lü's
public stature as a pioneering feminist helped the DPP attract
voters from Taiwan's active women's movement—though pro-
unification feminists remained leery of Lü's stance on Taiwan's
self-determination (Chang, 2009, 152–153). Campaign polls
showed Lü the favored vice presidential candidate, especially
popular with three sets of voters: women; younger voters
who hoped to improve Taiwan's international image; and
older voters who remembered her role in the Kaohsiung
Incident (Cooper, 2000, 27; Lü and Esarey, 2015, 264; United
News, February 13, 2000).
Since public opinion polls in Taiwan at the time paid little
attention to gender analysis, beginning in December 1999,
Awakening decided to bring these issues to the fore, calling on
candidates to take a stance on women's issues, and conducting
their own voter surveys. Their surveys found, perhaps not
surprisingly, that women voters placed more importance on
gender equity issues than men, but were not statistically
significant in terms of female voter preference for women
candidates (Lienhe bao/United News, September 1, 2000). A
subsequent Gallup poll conducted in January 2000 paid close
attention to female public opinion, finding that women over
the age of twenty viewed the Chen–Lü ticket as the most likely
to attract women's votes, and considered Chen the strongest of
the three presidential candidates (Chen Shui-bian, Lien Chan
and James Soong) on support for women's issues (Lienhe wan
bao/United EveningNews, January 29, 2000). In the end, however,
the three major candidates adopted similar stances on gender
issues, and election exit polls showed independent Soong
ultimately taking the majority of women's votes (Cooper, 2000,
32, 44).
Lü's record on women's issues
If Lü had campaigned on a feminist platform of gender
equality for Taiwan, what was her record on women's issues
once in office? Did she use her position of power to make
a difference for other women? Scholars have long debated
whether female politicians tend to support different issues, or
operate with a “different voice” than their male counterparts
(Githens and Prestage, 1978; Kelly et al., 1991; Jaquette, 1997;
Iwanaga, 2008). Lichun Chiang's study of Taiwanese womenlegislators (between 1998 and 2000) showed clearly different
policy preferences from their male colleagues, with a greater
commitment to welfare, health, children and education, and
less interest in military and foreign policy (Chiang, 2008).
However, Asia's “rulingwomen” have generally not been found
to operate with a “different voice,” and indeed have been
criticized for their resemblance to traditional male politicians
(Crossette, 1996). How does Lü, with her feminist track record,
measure up?
When Lü entered electoral politics in the 1990s, she shifted
her focus to foreign affairs—which had been a lifelong passion—
rather than the more typical areas of women's policy concerns
(Chiang, 2008). She thus moved in a different direction
than the autonomous women's movement, which pushed for
Taiwan to emulate the social welfare and gender-related
policies of the Nordic states, and to adopt stronger gender
quotas (Lee, 2014; Huang, 2015). During Lü's years as a
legislator and then county mayor (1993–2000), women's
groups and their allies were successful in lobbying for reform
of family law, public childcare, and the passage of the Juvenile
Prostitution Prevention Law (1995), the Sexual Assault Treat-
ment and Prevention Act (1997), and the Domestic Violence
Prevention Act (1998) (Chang, 2009; Chiang, 2008; Zeldin,
2008c). Similarly, during Lü's tenure as vice president (2000–
2008), several important pieces of legislation were passed,
including: the Two Genders' Employment Equality Law (2001),
amended to include protections for sexual minorities in the
revised Gender Employment Equality Law (2007); the Gender
Equity Education Act (2004); and the Sexual Harassment
Prevention Act (2005) (Zeldin, 2008a; “Taiwan Gender Equity
Education Act”; “Sexual Harassment Prevention Act”). In 2008,
the Domestic Violence Prevention Law and the Child and
Juvenile Welfare Law were amended Zeldin (2008b, 2008d).
Throughout, Lü focused on foreign affairs and had limited
participation in the passage of this legislation. Thus, Lü
gradually lost her identity as a feminist leader (Personal
communication July 2, 2011). In thewords of one [anonymous]
informant: “it was obvious that as soon as Lü Hsiu-lien entered
electoral politics, she kept her distance from the women's
movement… emphasizing her abilities in foreign affairs… to
appeal to male voters” (Personal communication July 2, 2011).
Another said: “after she entered electoral politics, it was
evident that raising the status of women was not her primary
focus. She would only raise these issues occasionally, when
needed, and it was completely unsatisfactory [to us]” (Personal
communication July 2, 2011). Notable in such comments is a
sense of betrayal from members of the women's movement
who felt that Lü had “moved on.”
Lü's diminishing visibility as an agenda-setter in Taiwan's
contemporary feminist movement was evident in discussions
concerning gender quotas during the 1990s, when women's
groups began advocating for reform of the reserved seats
system and for adoption of a 40% gender quota in political
representation (“Women's Political Participation”; Ku, 2008)
(Huang, 2015, 211). Lü, we will recall, was a long-standing
critic of Taiwan's reserved seats system. Particularly influential
in advocating for quota reforms was Peng Wan-ru, Director
of the DPP's Department of Women's Affairs, who pushed for
her party to adopt a one-fourth gender quota for candidates,
which they did in December 1996 (Huang, 2015, 212). The
series of quota reforms implemented in the 1990s and 2000s
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women in both local and national elections, and a constitu-
tional mandate (2005) that at least 50% of the party lists for
the parliamentary elections must be filled by women (Huang,
2015, 213–215). Under pressure from women's groups like
Awakening, in 2004, the Executive Yuan's Gender Equality
Committee passed a resolution calling for all Executive Yuan
departmental committees to adopt a one-third gender quota
(Fanchiang, 2003, “http://www.ey.gov.tw/gec_en/cp.aspx?n=
11EFF33070D6DF4,” Huang, 2015, 216). These reforms dem-
onstrated not only the impact of feminist advocacy on
government policy, but also the Taiwanese feminist
movement's shift away from the tenets of Lü's New Feminism
toward Nordic-inspired models (Fanchiang, 2003).
Lü's lack of public visibility in the passage of this legislation
and on the quota reforms does not mean she retreated from
feminism (Ziyou shibao/Liberty Times Net, November 11, 2015).
Indeed, as vice president, Lü kept her sights set on the
campaign promise to “usher in an era of gender equality in
which women and men administer national affairs together”
(Lü and Esarey, 2015, 261). The Chen–Lü administration
brought a number of prominent feminists into the government,
and achieved a record of women holding one-fourth of all
cabinet positions during their tenure (Lü and Esarey, 2015, 282;
Huang, 2015, 215; Lü, 2013). Lü hosted a Women's National
Affairs Conference and helped former “comfortwomen” in their
campaign to seek compensation from Japan (Lü, 2013). In
addition, although Lü never became a vocal advocate for quota
reforms, her promotion of the “two sexes governing together”
(liangxing gongzhi 兩性共治) ideal provided high-level political
influence supporting institutional measures to promote gender
parity. On the Chen–Lü watch, the Executive Yuan's Gender
Equality Committee called on all ministerial-level agencies to
establish gender equality taskforces (Fanchiang, 2003, “Gender
Equality Committee of the Executive Yuan,” Huang, 2015).
Moreover, Lü's shift to foreign affairs can be explained as
an attempt to avoid being pigeonholed. Elizabeth Esterchild
argues that “historically, women representatives have been
reluctant to push for women's specific interest because they
feared being labeled as too ‘narrow’ or as ‘only’ interested in
women's issues” (Esterchild, 2006, 532). Lü long ago recog-
nized this stereotype threat for women, writing in the
New Feminism, “first be a person, then be a man or a woman”
(xian zuoren, zaizuo nanren huo nuren 先作人,再作男人或女人)
(Lü, 1977a, 133–134). Focusing on foreign affairs enabled Lü to
break the gender barrier that had limited women's political
participation to the domain of “women's affairs,” as defined by
the KMT's Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.
Lü was also constrained by her desire to respect the
autonomy of the women's movement as it had evolved during
her years in prison and abroad. When we interviewed Lü on
this subject she stated:
I know they [feminist activists] worked very hard in those
days before the liberalization of electoral politics, and I know
that they did not get enough public recognition, but I don't
really knowhow to help them. They toldme theyprefer to keep
their own agency and don't want me to interfere with their
movement. They choose not to rely on political figures too
much. So I respect that and stand aside and try not to influence
them too much. But I am still willing to help, if they need me
(Interview with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010).Thus, if Lü appeared to distance herself from gender issues
after her entry into electoral politics, this was not simply due
to her political ambitions within a male-dominated political
domain, but also due to significant changes that had taken place
in the Taiwanese feminist movement since the 1970s (Teng,
1989; Ku, 1988; Chang, 2009; Rubinstein, 2004; Lu, 2004; Lee,
2004; Farris, 2004). The generation of feminists that emerged
in the 1980s was heavily influenced by Lü's New Feminism,
but they had also forged their own path in Lü's absence, and
eschewed close identification with her controversial stance on
Taiwanese self-determination (Lee, 2004). In addition, in the
post-martial law environment, a plurality of women's organi-
zations with diverse agendas sprang up in Taiwan: with a turn
to radical feminism, sexual liberation, LGBTQ issues, and even
Marxism, Lü's brand of “New Feminism” seemed out of step
with the times.2 According toMurray Rubenstein, by the 1990s
“some members of the new generation of Taiwanese women
view [Lü] as a bit old and dowdy—as a bit toomuch of a persona
from an earlier decade and a different stage in the struggle for
women's liberation” (Rubinstein, 2004, 271). In other words,
Taiwanese feminists were ready to throw out the spatula—and
to trade in their pens for bullhorns.
Obstacles to pursuing a feminist agenda
Given Lü's track record as a pioneering feminist, and her
self-proclaimed desire to distinguish herself from conservative
women leaders like Thatcher, it may seem surprising that she
was generally unable to promote a pro-woman agenda during
her tenure as vice president. In order to explain this apparent
paradox, we must also examine the socially constructed gen-
der barriers faced by Lü within her political environment
(Fleschenberg, 2008; Sun, 2005). Lü herself identified gender
as a constraint to her actions as vice president. As Lü explained
in an interview, she had agreed to be Chen's runningmate based
on his promise of a full partnership between president and vice
president, man and woman. After the election, Lü recalled,
“When I became vice president, I felt that the promise changed.
There was a huge gap between before and after the election, I
started to realize I had nothing to do as the vice president.
Nobody paid attention tome, and I didn't have any power at all”
(Interview with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010). Although this lack
of power stemmed from the constitutional definition of the vice
presidential role, Lü perceived her sidelining as an effect of
gender discrimination. To the degree that party bosses expected
Lü to play the role of Chen's “political wife” (zhengzhi shang de
taitai政治上的太太) Lü was not incorrect.
Almost immediately after the election, it became evident
that Lü's feminist identity was a source of tension within the
party. A firestorm was kicked up in May 2000 when Lü told
foreign reporters that she considered Taiwan “an independent
sovereign state,” triggering denunciation from Beijing. The
pressmademuch of Lü's stance as an independentwomanwho
spoke her mind and was beholden only to her own ideals, and
not her party or even the president himself (Landler, 2000).
Some in the DPP called Lü a “loose cannon,” or “big mouth,”
while others urged her to take a backseat to Chen. The media
played up images of Lü as a “loud mouth crow,” and a “bossy”
woman eager to grabmedia attention and steal Chen's thunder.
Rumors circulated that senior advisers were working to
marginalize or silence Lü in an effort at damage control.
Fig. 2. “Aggrieved Woman of the Inner Palace,” “The party chairman wants me
to hang some lights so that you can read the Constitution.” Source: [Cartoonist]
Yufu, Liberty Times, April 16, 2000. Used with permission.
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complain of gender discrimination, saying: “Don't treat me this
way because I am a woman” (Zhongguo shibao/China Times,
Lienhe bao/United Times, Ziyou shibao/Liberty Times, 14, 15 and
16 April 2000). In fact, Lü had long been subjected to micro-
aggressions from individual men within the DPP, who were
unable to accept her outspoken and dominant leadership style,
which does not conform to common expectations of feminine
demureness in Taiwan. As a grassroots opposition organization,
the DPP had long been a male-dominated political party, with
men assuming most of the leadership roles and women
generally playing subordinate roles as support staff or volun-
teers. As Lünoted of theparty's gender culture in our interview:
“If you are a service-oriented type of woman then [men in the
party] like you, but if you want to become a decision-maker, it
depends if you can compromise with them or not” (Interview
with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010). This is consistent with Tsai-
Wei Sun's findings that, despite gains in the numerical
representation of women in politics “the politics in the [Asia]
region is still a ‘masculinemodel of politics.’Men still dominate
the political arena, formulate the rules of the game, and define
the standards for evaluation” (Sun, 2005, 161).
The gender issue soon became a hot topic in themedia,with
newspaper cartoons caricaturing Lü as an “aggrievedwoman in
the inner palace” (shengong yuanfu深宮怨婦), crying alone in
the women's quarters (see Figs. 1 and 2). Angered by the
negative press, President Chen and powerful men in the DPP
criticized Lü for what they regarded as false accusations of
gender discrimination. They argued that Lü's subordinate
position as vice president had nothing to do with gender, but
was rather dictated by very nature of the vice presidential office
as defined by the Constitution.
On the face of it, this explanation appears legitimate.
However, responses by male politicians to the media storm
revealed that gender dynamics were deeply imbricated in
the party's treatment of Lü. DPP party bosses countered Lü's
complaints by suggesting that she ought to serve as the
president's “political wife” (Lü, 2001, 11). This comment was
partially prompted by the fact that President Chen's wife had
been confined to a wheelchair after an auto accident, limiting
her public appearances as the First Lady, but really aimed to put
Lü “in her place” by suggesting she should assume a properly
subordinate position to Chen. When interviewed, Lü bitterly
recalled: “From the moment I became vice president, from theFig. 1. “Aggrieved [woman] of the Inner Palace” (the book reads “two sexes
governing together”). Source: [Cartoonist] Hunter Chen, Liberty Times, April 15,
2000. Used with permission.secondday, everyone in theDPPwas jealous ofme. They treated
me like a political wife and they wanted me to keep my mouth
shut. But I wanted to be a real vice president and I wanted to do
and speak what I should do and say. I cannot keep silent and
do nothing. I was chosen by our citizens. I represented them”
(Interview with Lü Hsiu-lien, 21 July, 2010). Similarly, in her
account of her first year in office, Lü reflected:
…right after I was elected, there were many cartoons and
media commentaries describing me as “resentful,” as an
“aggrieved woman of the inner palace,” and even people
suggesting I should be the “president's political wife,” and
other disrespectful and inappropriate characterizations.
This is absolutely due to gender factors. Because people
are typically used to seeing the First Lady by the president's
side, and not a female vice president, it is very difﬁcult to
change this type of traditional attitude (Lü, 2001, 7).
She further recalled:
From the moment of my nomination through our election
victory, President Chen continually emphasized that his
vice president deﬁnitely would not be a “voiceless person”
[like former Vice President Li Yuan-zu], and would not be a
“ﬂower vase,” but would be a “co-participant in national
affairs.” This was something he said, and not something
I demanded… The strange thing was, immediately after
the election the pressure came down and suddenly things
reverted to the Li Yuan-zu era, and they wanted the vice
president to be voiceless (meiyou shengyin 沒有聲音). Then
you add the gender factors… (Lü, 2001, 10).
As a result of the controversy, Lü's reputation within the
DPP and in the Taiwanmedia was tarnished. Amedia darling at
the beginning of her vice presidential candidacy, Lü faced
strong hostility in the press after she complained of her lack of
power as a vice president. Opposition to Lü within the party
came to a head in the run-up to the 2004 election, when Chen
faced pressure frommale leaders to drop Lü from the ticket. At
a press conference, a group of DPP legislators urged Chen to
consider three conditions in selecting a runningmate: meeting
social expectations; ability to “add points” to the ticket; and
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anti-Lü sentiment was palpable” ("Lü lacks popularity," www.
huaxia.com, November 6, 2003). In contrast to polls leading up
to the 2000 election, Lü was no longer the favored vice
presidential candidate, with one poll showing 53% selecting
James Soong as the vice presidential candidate most likely to
strengthen his party's ticket, and only 26% saying the same for
Lü (Lienhe bao/United News, December 13, 2003). Campaign
polls furthermore indicated the Chen–Lü ticket garnering
support from only 35.5% of women voters, while 46.1%
supported the Lien–Soong ticket (Su, 2007, 91). Nonetheless,
with a factional power struggle underway in the DPP, Chen
decided to keep Lü as a running mate in order to neutralize
dueling factions led by two powerful men (Su, 2007, 91).
In the aftermath of the “political wife” controversy, Lü
faced two types of constraints as vice president: the first was
structural, deriving from the limited constitutional role of the
vice president; the second stemmed from the patriarchal
political culture of the DPP, which proved doubly difficult to
navigate given Lü's lack of a strong male patron within the
party. Sociocultural expectations were another factor. As Sun
has shown, “although women are encouraged to participate
and involve into politics and administrations, they are expected
to participate as ‘supporting’ roles to help men, but not to go
beyond. In other words, the social values of Taiwan society
remain not much encouraging and supportive of women
to become top leaders in politics [sic]” (Sun, 2005, 163). In
the face of these obstacles, Lü was unable to fully leverage an
“old girls' network” (Jaquette, 1997), although women had a
“critical mass” in the legislature and women's organizations
likeAwakeningwere gaining influence in shapingpublic policy.
This limitation can be explained by the KMT's majority in the
legislature, which compelled women's groups to avoid close
association with DPP leaders, and by the gap that had opened
between Lü and the contemporary Taiwanese feminist move-
ment. Given these constraints, it proved impossible for Lü to
act as a strongly identifiable “feminist” vice president. As one
feminist activist asserted: “In my opinion, she is only a female
vice president, and cannot be called a feminist vice president,
because she really never did anything for women!”(Personal
communication July 2, 2011). Lü found herself sandwiched
between party patriarchs and traditionalistswho branded her a
“loudmouth” feminist, and women activists who considered
her not radical enough.
Deﬁning feminist leadership
An assessment of Lü's status as “feminist” vice president
must consider her own self-identification. We posed the
question to Lü in an interview: “Do you consider yourself a
female vice president or a feminist vice president?” Lü replied:
“Both.” How do we account for the gap between Lü's self-
perception and her record promoting a pro-woman agenda?
This begs the question of how does one define “feminist
leadership” in the first place (Offen, 1988; O'Conner, 2010). In
their study of feminist leadership, Chin et al. (2008) argue that
“a truly transformational approach to theorizing feminist
leadership allows us to question the basic definition of who is
a leader and how leadership is enacted” (Chin et al., 2008, 37).
Their research revealed a broad spectrum of female leadership
styles and a “strong consensus that feminist leadership is morethan leadership style based on female socialization. Feminist
leaders are acutely and constantly aware of their parallel roles
to serve at the helm aswell as to bring about change in power—
not only forwomen, but also for underrepresented racial/ethnic
and other oppressed groups” (Chin et al., 2008, 70). If we go
back to Lü's New Feminism, we find that a broad vision of
“women's rights as human rights” has been central in the
evolution of her feminist thought and action. Lü has sought
throughout her political career to champion the oppressed
and subordinated, but over time she increasingly defined
“the oppressed” not as women per se, but as the “voiceless”
Taiwanese people as a whole. Hence, Lü widened her sphere of
concerns outward from women's status in Taiwan, to the
democratization of Taiwan, and finally to the fight for Taiwan's
recognition on the global stage. As she told us, women are only
one among many oppressed groups in society, and men have
also suffered from the strictures of traditional gender roles
(Interview, Lü Hsiu-lien, 17 July, 1988). In other words, Lü
adopted a viewpoint that patriarchy is a broader system of
oppression that in the words of bell hooks “has no gender”
(hooks, 2010, 170). Indeed, articulating such insights in the
1980s, Lü belonged to a generation of women of color and non-
Western feminists that pushed white, middle-class feminism
to recognize an intersectional approach combining gender,
race/ethnicity, and culture (Teng, 1989). As her thinking
evolved, Lü replaced her early slogan of “holding a spatula
in the left hand, and a pen in the right,” with “supporting
feminists with the left hand, and promoting democratists
with the right” (zuoshou fuchi xinnüxing, youshou tuicu
minzhuren 左手扶持新女性,右手推促民主人) (Lin, 1991; Lü, 2015).
During the 2000 presidential campaign, Lü emphasized the key
role of the DPP in empowering the oppressed and giving voice
to those who had been excluded from political participation,
thus exhibiting feminist leadership as defined above (Lü, 2006,
34). Indeed, while it may appear that Lü abandoned women's
issues to focus on international relations, a closer examination
of her vision for Taiwan's future reveals underlying links with
her feminist ethos.
“Soft power” and female leadership
When asked if a woman brings any “difference” to the office
of vice president, Lü replied with reference to her efforts to
promote “soft power” as the key to Taiwan's future on the
international stage. Whereas the Cold War conflict between
Taiwan and China primarily involved military and economic
contests of power, Lü sought to articulate a new path for
Taiwan's future based on “soft power,” a concept she derived
from Joseph Nye. Nye (1990) described “soft power” as a
country's influence through attraction, in contrast to “hard
power” as coercion or payment (“sticks and carrots”). Bringing
a “different voice” to her conceptualization of “soft power,”
Lü put her own personal stamp on the concept by relating
it to difference feminism: women, she told us, are especially
equipped to recognize the benefits of soft power, unlike men,
who often remain preoccupied with contests of hard power.
As articulated in Soft Power: Vision for a New Era (Lü, 2006),
a collection of Lü's vice presidential speeches, she “advocated
the implementation of soft power politics and the need for
Taiwan to distinguish itself through its adoption of soft power”
(Lü, 2006, Preface ). Given themilitary and diplomatic impasse
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Taiwan's economic power, Lü argued that soft power, as an
alternative path, provided thekey to Taiwan's future. Lü defined
Taiwan's soft power “as referring to human rights, democracy,
peace, love, and technological progress” (Lü, 2006, Preface ),
and identified women's emancipation, on top of Taiwan's
“economic miracle” and the “follow-up political miracle” of
peaceful democratization, as a core feature of Taiwan's soft
power (Lü, 2006, Preface). In contrast to official DPP statements,
Lü consistently put gender equality front and center of her
vision for the new, democratic Taiwan, identifying gender
equality as one of four essential elements of a strong foundation
for democracy (Lü, 2006, 55–56).
She moreover gendered soft power by invoking difference
feminism. Lü asserted that women possess “their own soft
powers of mercy, beauty, wisdom and courage” (Lü, 2006,
30). These gendered differences, she argued, should not be
suppressed but rather harnessed to transform the political
arena, promoting democratization and even global peace. As
she wrote of women's capacity for mercy: “I have often said
that 99.9 per cent of the wars in human history have been
started by men. If there were more women making decisions,
peace would prevail” (Lü, 2006, 30–31). Of women's beauty,
she claimed: “With more women in the public sector, politics
will become cleaner, and nicer. Withmore women, politics can
bemore beautiful” (Lü, 2006, 31). According to Lü, these special
feminine qualities are potential assets to Taiwan in the pursuit
of soft power as global influence. Thus, she refashioned foreign
affairs as a “soft” issue, consistent with the notion of female
leadership as a “different voice.” Examples of her “soft power”
efforts to promote Taiwan's presence and visibility in the global
arena include her founding of the Democratic Pacific Union, an
extra-governmental group of 28 Pacific Rim democracies, her
“Sending Love to Tibet” campaign, and a humanitarian relief
drive for refugees in Afghanistan (Lü, 2006, 6–7). In 2001, she
received the “World Peace Prize” from the World Peace Corps
Mission for her efforts to promote world peace, human rights,
women's rights, and democracy (Lü, 2006, 85). Although
Lü's relational feminism is no longer at the “cutting edge” of
Taiwanese feminism, her “soft power” campaign is an example
of feminist leadership deeply informed by an ethos derived
from her personal vision of difference feminism (Chang, 2009).
Conclusion
Unlike the case of South Korea, which seems to confirm the
popular notion of dynastic descent as the sole route to the top
leadership for Asian women, Taiwan affirms that female
leaders in Asia can break the molds of dynastic or tokenistic
leadership, both of which depend on male patronage, and rely
on their individual achievements and political networks to
reach the top levels of national leadership. A strong example of
electoral success, Lü's record in office in terms of pro-woman
agenda setting ismore difficult to assess. Aswe have argued, Lü
faced various constraints in pursuing an overt feminist agenda
as vice president. In structural terms, she was constrained by
the lack of constitutional power accorded the vice president, and
by her lack of a strong support network within the patriarchal
political culture of her party. Negative media attention aroused
by her failure to conform to expectations of proper subordinate
behavior led to her labeling as a “bossy woman,” and an“aggrievedwoman of the inner palace,” further constraining her
power to advance her agenda. The gap between Lü and Taiwan's
contemporary women's movement additionally diminished her
recognition as a feminist spokesperson. Given these constraints,
we contend that Lü's lack of a clear record on this score does not
make her by default a “tame kitten.”
Indeed, Lü faced a double standard in her vice presidency:
needing to excel in foreign affairs in order to prove she was
not a narrow “women's issues” representative, she was still
expected to devote time to women's affairs (see Hoogensen
and Solheim, 2006). Moreover, despite her impressive aca-
demic and professional credentials in foreign affairs, Lü felt
compelled to articulate a feminine dimension to “soft power” to
help legitimate her expertise in this domain. The gendered
expectations placed on women leaders, inherent in the label
“tame kitten,” create a dual burden that deserves further
scrutiny.
Lü's case also points to the difficulty of clearly identifying
“women's interests”: recognition of “within-group diversity,”
which is especially pronounced in Taiwan's case owing to both
ethnic politics and “Blue (KMT) versus Green (DPP)” tensions,
is crucial to avoid essentialism and highlight instead the
competing claims of “women's interests” put forward by
various actors (Celis et al., 2014, 171). Hence, we foreground
Lü's own indigenous feminist theory as a vital element in
assessing her degree of substantive representation. Lü's
insistence on the inseparability of women's emancipation and
Taiwanese self-determination is core to her personal vision of
feminist leadership—even as it has alienated her at times from
patriarchal male Dangwai leaders, on one hand, and from
politically neutral feminists, on the other. If “good” substantive
representation is “conceived of as a process, involving debate,
deliberation, and contestation over group interests, occurring
inside and outside of formal institutions” (Celis et al., 2014,
151), Lü's role in high-visibility debates surrounding gender
and political leadership shows her as a catalyst for productive
conflict in the contestation over women's interests.
After serving as vice president for eight years, Lüwas unable
to break the final glass ceiling of the presidency and failed to
win the DPP primary. Nonetheless, her vice presidency broke
the mold of Asia's top women leaders as dynastic family
representatives, and opened the door for her fellow DPP
member Dr. Tsai Ing-wen to become Taiwan's first female
presidential candidate in the 2012 election. Although Tsai
lost this election by a narrow margin to the incumbent Ma
Ying-jeou, her candidacy was convincing enough to enable a
second run, and ultimate victory, in the 2016 presidential
election. Women's progress in the political arena was further
confirmed during this election cycle when the right-wing KMT
stepped up in July 2015 to nominate a female candidate, Hung
Hsiu-chu (replaced by Eric Chu in October 2015), launching
Taiwan's “woman on woman” presidential race as trumpeted in
the international press for a few heady months in 2015 (Yen,
2015).
Hence, in the final analysis, if “the burning question” for
scholars studying female political leadership is whether
“women politicians make a difference for other women”
(Fleschenberg, 2008, 49), our answer in Lü's case is a resounding
yes: her pioneering efforts, first with the Taiwanese feminist
movement of the 1970s, then in the electoral arena of the 1990s
and 2000s, and finally in the top leadership as vice president,
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progress of peaceful democratization and women's emancipa-
tion, a facet of the island's development that observers declare
“underline[s] the genuine, gaping differences between” Taiwan
and China (Ridge, 2015). Taiwan in 2016 is a very different
place for women than in 1971, when the government con-
sidered setting a cap on women's college admissions, and it is
undeniable that Lü has played a major role in this sociocultural
change.Whether or not one agreeswith Lü's brand of feminism,
she has been an original thinker and prolific writer who
has contributed fundamentally to the development of what
Chang has called an “indigenous strand of relational feminism
independent from Western influence” (Chang, 2009, 9; Ku,
1998). Her early feminist activism set the stage for gender
issues to become “hot and popular” in Taiwan today, propelling
candidates of both sexes to address these issues (Sun, 2005,
158). Lü helped to move Taiwanese women's participation in
electoral politics beyond the political proxy stage of the 1980s,
and she has made a difference for other women by serving as a
highly visible role model proving that a woman can enter the
high ranks of political leadership based on her own merits.
According to Joyce Gelb's interviews of Taiwanese women
politicians, Lü has inspired “an entire generation of Taiwanese
women” (Gelb, 2010, 4). Considering the long-term impact of
her legacy, we conclude that Lü has been an effective agent
of “refreshing” social change for Asian women, and a feminist
pioneer for social justice, and not simply a “[throwback] to the
past” and entrenched political hierarchies (Crossette, 1996).
The power of such transformational leadership to make a
difference for Taiwan's women (and men) is not adequately
captured,we argue, in the false dichotomyof “roaring tigress” or
“tame kitten.” Perhaps the image of a lone mountain climber,
facing an uphill ascentwith her sights ever set on the top,would
be more apt.
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Endnotes
1 The DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen ran against the KMT's Eric Chu. Hung
Hsiu-chu was the ofﬁcial KMT nominee from July 19 to October 17, 2015.
2 More recently, Lü has spoken on the need to expand gender equity to
include sexual minorities or the “third sex.” Lü, 2015.
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